

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 IO-13 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AF-10

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, CCD

SUBJECT: CCD: AUGUST 25 INFORMAL MEETING WITH EXPERTS ON
CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW)

1. SUMMARY: IN THIRD AND FINAL CCD INFORMAL MEETING WITH
EXPERTS, HELD ON AUGUST 25, STATEMENTS WERE MADE BY EXPERTS OR
REPS OF HUNGARY, JAPAN, POLAND, NETHERLANDS, AND USSR.
END SUMMARY

2. HUNGARIAN EXPERT (SEBOK), REFERRING TO THE HUNGARIAN
WORKING PAPER (CCD/537) ON TOXICITY THRESHOLDS, STATED
THAT THERE ARE TWO ALTERNATIVES: (A) SPECIFY BOTH INJECTION (LD50)
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AND INHALATION (LT C50) VALUES; OR (B) USE A MATHEMATICAL FORMULA
TO GENERATE AN INHALATION VALUE FROM THE INJECTION VALUE, SO
THAT ONLY THE LATTER NEED BE SPECIFIED. THIS SECOND METHOD, HE
SAID, WAS THE ONE RECOMMENDED IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKING PAPER.
THE CONVERSION TECHNIQUE SEEMED WIDELY ACCEPTED IN PROFESSIONAL
LITERATURE, HE SAID, BUT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT DIFFERENT OPINIONS
ALSO EXIST, AS FOR EXAMPLE THAT OF THE YUGOSLAV EXPERT.

3. THE PARTICULAR TOXICITY VALUES SELECTED IN THE HUNGARIAN WORKING PAPER, HUNGARIAN EXPERT STATED, WERE ONLY ILLUSTRATIVE, SINCE THERE ARE NO INTERNATIONALLY STANDARDIZED MEASURES OF TOXICITY. IN ANY CASE, HUNGARIAN EXPERT INDICATED, THE TOXICITY VALUES MUST BE HIGH ENOUGH TO PRECLUDE AMBIGUITY WITH RESPECT TO CHEMICALS HAVING TOXICITY LEVELS VERY CLOSE TO THE THRESHOLD. HE BELIEVED THE VALUES SELECTED ARE HIGH ENOUGH TO INCLUDE ALL ANTI-PERSONNEL CW AGENTS, AMOUNTING TO A COMPREHENSIVE PROHIBITION: SUPER-TOXIC AGENTS, NERVE GASES AND V-AGENTS, OTHER TOXIC AGENTS, AND IRRITANTS. BINARY CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AS WELL AS MULTI-COMPONENT WEAPONS, MUST BE BANNED, HUNGARIAN EXPERT DECLARED; THESE WOULD NOT REPRESENT NEW AGENTS AS SUCH, BUT THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS WOULD DIFFER FROM THOSE USED WITH TRADITIONAL CW AGENTS.

4. IN REGARD TO THE DEFINITION OF INCAPACITANTS, HUNGARIAN EXPERT STATED THAT AS THE US HAD SUGGESTED IN ITS WORKING PAPER CCD/531, CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO RELYING SOLELY ON THE GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION. OR, HE SAID, MEDIAN INCAPACITATING TOXICITY VALUE (IC T59) MIGHT BE USED; IN ANY CASE, MORE CONSIDERATION OF THIS QUESTION IS NEEDED.

5. JAPANESE REP (OGISO), INDICATING THAT HE WOULD ADDRESS THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE CCD'S WORK TOWARD A CW BAN RATHER THAN TECHNICAL ASPECTS, STATED THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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NEARING THE END OF ITS SUMMER SESSION WITH A CERTAIN SENSE OF FRUSTRATION, SINCE IT HAD NOT BEEN POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH A WORKING GROUP AND MAKE THE DEGREE OF PROGRESS HOPED FOR IN THE SPRING. YET BECAUSE IT IS EASY TO ASSUME THAT DRAFTING A CW CONVENTION WILL BE VERY DIFFICULT AND TIME-CONSUMING, ONE MIGHT SEPARATE OUT SOME SPECIFIC ASPECTS AND FRAME THE CORRESPONDING TREATY ARTICLES: SCOPE; THE TYPE OF TOXICITY CRITERIA TO BE USED IN ADDITION TO THE GENERAL PURPOSE CRITERION; INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION PROCEDURES; PROCEDURES FOR THE INSPECTION OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION; INSPECTION FOR DISPOSITION OF FACTORIES FORMERLY USED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF SINGLE-PURPOSE CW AGENTS. NEGOTIATIONS ON ALL THESE QUESTIONS, JAPANESE REP DECLARED, WILL REQUIRE NOT ONLY POLITICAL CONSIDERATION, BUT ALSO TECHNICAL AND LEGAL EXPERTISE. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF CW NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED AS SLOWLY IN THE FUTURE AS THEY HAVE THIS YEAR, JAPANESE REP STATED, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PRESENT PRACTICAL RESULTS TO THE UNGA SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD). IF CCD WANTS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT IT REMAINS OF VALUE, JAPANESE REP REMARKED, IT SHOULD FIND SOME WAY TO BREAK THE IMPASSE.

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6. IF THERE WERE EVEN PARTIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR, JAPANESE REP ASKED, WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO PRESENT THE AGREED KEY ELEMENTS TO THE CCD, SO AS TO START MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS? THIS METHOD, HE SAID, WOULD NOT ONLY FREE THE COMMITTEE FROM ITS FRUSTRATION, BUT WOULD ALSO ENABLE IT TO MAKE A SPECIFIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE SSOD. JAPANESE REP STATED HE WOULD SUPPORT THE IDEA OF RECONVENING THE CCD AT ANY TIME, BASED ON PROGRESS BETWEEN THE US AND USSR ON A JOINT CW INITIATIVE, EITHER AMOUNTING TO AGREEMENT ON ALL OF THE KEY ELEMENTS OR ONLY ON SOME.

7. POLISH EXPERT (CZERKAWSKI) STATED THAT THE MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF A CW CONVENTION WOULD DEPEND ON ITS SCOPE,
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AND THAT THERE SEEM TO BE PROMISING TRENDS IN THE DIRECTION OF EXPANDING IT. HE SHARED THE US VIEW EXPRESSED IN WORKING PAPER CCD/531 ABOUT INCAPACITANTS, THAT IF THEY WERE NOT COVERED IN A CW BAN THEIR MILITARY ROLE MIGHT INCREASE. POLISH EXPERT STATED HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO INCLUDING INCAPACITANTS IN A CW BAN.

8. IF THERE WERE TO BE A CONSENSUS ON A FURTHER EXPANSION OF THE SCOPE OF PROHIBITION, POLISH EXPERT STATED HE WOULD FAVOR INCLUDING IRRITANTS (ALSO REFERRED TO AS RIOT CONTROL AGENTS) WHICH ARE CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS. POLISH EXPERT DECLARED HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE REASONS WHY CERTAIN DELS ARE RELUCTANT TO INCLUDE IRRITANTS, SINCE THERE SEEMS TO BE A CONSENSUS ON A TOTAL PROHIBITION OF DUAL-PURPOSE CW AGENTS. LIMITED QUANTITIES OF IRRITANTS COULD BE PRODUCED AND STOCKED FOR POLICE WORK AND RIOT CONTROL PURPOSES, POLISH EXPERT STATED, BUT THESE QUANTITIES WOULD BE RELATIVELY SMALL IN COMPARISON WITH THE AMOUNT NEEDED FOR WARFARE, AND ONE COULD SEE TO IT THAT NO UNJUSTIFIED AMOUNTS WERE PRODUCED AND STOCKPILED.

9. NETHERLANDS REP (EERBURG) SUPPORTED THE JAPANESE PROPOSAL FOR TREATY NEGOTIATIONS LIMITED TO SPECIFIED ISSUES, SAYING THAT THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS LIABLE TO BE EXTREMELY COMPLICATED AND THAT IT WOULD BE A PITY TO LOSE TIME. THIS IDEA, HE SAID, RESEMBLES A BRITISH PROPOSAL RAISED EARLIER IN THE SUMMER, FOR A WORKING GROUP TO ADDRESS SPECIFIED ASPECTS OF A CW BAN.

10. USSR REP (LIKHACHEV), AFFIRMING THE USEFULNESS OF THE COMMITTEE'S SERIES OF INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH EXPERTS ON CW, STATED IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO REPEAT THE USSR'S POSITION IN DETAIL, BECAUSE THOSE VIEWS HAD BEEN SET FORTH IN A NUMBER LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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OF PLENARY STATEMENTS. HE EXPRESSED GRATIFICATION THAT A NUMBER OF REPS AND EXPERTS HAD REACTED WITH INTEREST TO THE SOVIET IDEAS ON CW VERIFICATION, AS CONTAINED IN WORKING PAPERS CCD/538 AND CCD/539, AND THAT THEY WOULD BE STUDIED IN GREATER DETAIL.

11. SOVIET EXPERT (DUMAEV), ADDRESSING CW VERIFICATION, DECLARED THAT THE USSR PROCEEDS FROM TWO MAJOR PRINCIPLES: (A) NO CONTROL METHOD SHOULD INFRINGE ON THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF STATES PARTIES, NOR LEAD TO DISCLOSURES OF A STATE'S INDUSTRIAL OR MILITARY SECRETS; AND (B) THE CHOICE OF INDIVIDUAL MEANS OF CONTROL SHOULD BE BASED ON TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES. BOTH OF THESE CRITERIA, SOVIET EXPERT STATED, CAN BE SATISFIED BY NATIONAL MEANS OF CONTROL, BY LABORATORY

METHODS, BY EXTRATERRITORIAL MONITORING, AND BY INDIRECT (STATISTICAL) METHODS. REGARDING INDIRECT METHODS, SOVIET EXPERT EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH REMARKS MADE ON AUGUST 24 BY GDR EXPERT, DECLARING THAT FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND THE EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION WILL INCREASE THE USEFULNESS OF INDIRECT METHODS TO THE OVERALL VERIFICATION REGIME.

12. REMOTE OBSERVATION, OR NATIONAL MEANS OF EXTRATERRITORIAL MONITORING, HAD IN THE SOVIET EXPERT'S VIEW AN OBVIOUS ADVANTAGE OVER ON-SITE TECHNIQUES, NOT REQUIRING THE PRESENCE OF NUMEROUS PERSONS OR THE PLACEMENT OF A LARGE QUANTITY OF MONITORING APPARATUS ON A CONTROLLED SITE. EXISTING MEASURING DEVICES WHICH OPERATE SPECTROSCOPICALLY, SOVIET EXPERT STATED, CAN DETECT VERY SMALL QUANTITIES OF CHEMICALS AT GREAT DISTANCES, BEYOND NATIONAL BOUNDARIES. USSR EXPERT INDICATED THAT CALCULATIONS IN THE RECENT SOVIET WORKING PAPER (CCD/538) WHICH RELATE TO SATELLITE MONITORING, ALSO RELATE TO THE SOVIET WORKING PAPER (CCD/331) OF 1972 AND ARE BASED ON THEORETICAL DATA ACCUMULATED IN RECENT YEARS. THE USE OF SATELLITES FOR REMOTE VERIFICATION, SOVIET EXPERT DECLARED, IS A REALITY AND IS FULLY FEASIBLE, LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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AS CONFIRMED BY THE BROAD USE OF SATELLITES IN METEOROLOGY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CARTOGRAPHY, GEOGRAPHY, AND SO ON.

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13. SOVIET EXPERT DECLARED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO CONFIRM CW PRODUCTION AND FIELD TRIALS BY USING SATELLITES, SAYING THAT AT LEAST ONE SATELLITE COULD BE PLACED PERMANENTLY IN A STATIONARY ORBIT, AS IS DONE FOR COMMUNICATION SATELLITES. THE NUMBER OF OTHER SATELLITES, SOVIET EXPERT STATED, WOULD DEPEND ON THE NATURE OF THE VERIFICATION NEEDS, TOGETHER WITH THE CAPABILITIES OF EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN THE SATELLITE AND THE CHOICE OF ORBITS. THE NETHERLANDS CALCULATIONS, SOVIET EXPERT STATED, ARE EXAGGERATED, BECAUSE IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO ENVISION CONTINUOUS OBSERVATION OF EVERY PART OF THE CONTINENTS; INSTEAD, SOVIET EXPERT STATED, SELECTIVE MONITORING WOULD BE SUFFICIENT, RELATING TO THE TIME AND PLACE OF SUSPECTED VIOLATIONS. SINCE ONLY THE STATE

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PLACING A CW VERIFICATION SATELLITE IN SPACE WOULD BE ABLE TO DIFFERENTIATE IT FROM MANY OTHER SATELLITES, SOVIET EXPERT DECLARED, A POSSIBLE VIOLATOR WOULD HAVE TO CALCULATE THAT HE WOULD BE EXPOSING HIMSELF TO BEING CAUGHT.

14. GIVEN THAT THE PROCESS OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION IS ESTIMATED BY SOME COUNTRIES TO LAST BETWEEN FIVE AND TEN YEARS, SOVIET EXPERT EXPRESSED SERIOUS DOUBTS THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ORGANIZE INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION PURELY ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS ALONE. THE IDEA OF INTERNATIONAL MONITORING AMOUNTING TO FOREIGN DIRECT TECHNICAL INSPECTION OF FACILITIES, OVERRIDING NATIONAL CONTROL PERSONNEL, SEEMED TO THE SOVIET EXPERT TO PROVIDE NO GUARANTEE AGAINST ERROR, BECAUSE OF THE PERIODIC NATURE OF INSPECTIONS. IN COMPARISON, SOVIET EXPERT DECLARED, EACH STATE PARTY WOULD HAVE INCOMPARABLY GREATER POSSIBILITIES AVAILABLE TO IT THROUGH EXTRATERRITORIAL MONITORING THAN BY ANY OTHER MEANS.

15. CONCLUDING, SOVIET EXPERT DECLARED THAT NATIONAL MEANS OF INTRA- AND EXTRA-TERRITORIAL CONTROL WILL PROVIDE FULL CAPABILITIES FOR ENSURING ADEQUATE COMPLIANCE BY ALL STATES PARTIES, AND THAT WHEN THESE METHODS ARE COMBINED WITH

CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURES OF CONTROL, THERE WILL BE A FULL
POSSIBILITY FOR CONTROLLING ALL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO CW.

16. THIS INFORMAL MEETING WAS THE FINAL ONE OF THE CURRENT
SERIES ON CW. VANDEN HEUVERL

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Message Attributes

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